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BOOK REVIEW
ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES.
By M6xrio Marques Mendes
Reviewed by Spencer Weber Waller*
The studies of international trade law and antitrust law are
fundamentally one and the same. They are both the study of
competition. However, in theory, and in practice, the two areas
have been approached from vastly different perspectives. Tradi-
tionally, antitrust has been conceived of as the study of competi-
tion within a market and international trade as governing com-
petition between markets.
Within the United States, competition principles have been
enshrined in a century old statute, the Sherman Act,1 which has
been described as a "charter of economic liberty."2 The Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) included explicit competition
provisions in the Treaty of Rome because of the centrality of a
system of effective competition in building and preserving the
common market.3 The vast majority of developed market econo-
mies have their own national competition laws.4 The newly de-
veloping nations have a growing interest in the creation and en-
forcement of competition norms within their economies. The
nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics also have
turned their attention to the legal regulation of competition as
part of their movement toward a market economy and a more
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Professor Waller is the author
of INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRusT LAw.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 - § 7 (1991).
2. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
3. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, articles 85-86, 90 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
4. See generally J. VON KALINowsI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION (1987);. ORGANIZA-
TION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON REsTRic-
TIvE BusiNEss PRACTICES (3d ed. 1976).
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democratic and open society.
The fervor for competition has not traditionally included
the regulation of international trade. Trade across national
boundaries has been a privilege, not a right. Competition and
consumer welfare have, at most, been a minor component in the
constellation of values implemented by national and interna-
tional trade policies. Tariffs, quotas, nontariff barriers, voluntary
restraints, and temporary import relief measures exist in re-
sponse to economic and political forces that are seemingly im-
pervious to the overriding concern for the enforcement of com-
petition within the domestic economy.
International trade is often beyond the reach of national an-
titrust law in another fundamental aspect. Most nations have
never applied their antitrust laws to pure export conduct.5 Some
nations regard exports simply as beyond the jurisdiction of their
national competition laws. Other nations tacitly or explicitly ap-
prove export cartels aimed at foreign markets.
The separation of international trade and antitrust law is
accentuated by the specialization of the teaching and practice of
these vital areas as separate disciplines. Few academics combine
both fields as part of their teaching and research. The law school
curriculum is split into antitrust courses and international eco-
nomic law courses with a limited opportunity for overlap, and
there is limited faculty and student interest to make such an
experiment worthwhile from an institutional perspective.
These distinctions carry over into practice. In the United
States, antitrust law is enforced by the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, state attorneys general, and private litigants. In con-
trast, the international trade statutes are administered by the
Customs Service of the United States Treasury Department, the
International Trade Administration of the Department of Com-
merce, the International Trade Commission, the United States
Trade Representative, and occasional participation from other
federal agencies in the absence of a single United States Depart-
ment of Trade. Unlike the litigation and counseling practice of
antitrust lawyers, the practice of most international trade attor-
neys focuses on administrative proceedings and lobbying of the
legislature and agencies which control the trade policy process,
5. See generally Symposium: An International Antitrust Challenge, 10 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 1-149 (1989).
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with litigation typically limited to appellate review of an admin-
istrative record. Few practitioners are conversant in both diver-
gent bodies of law and procedure.
Each field comes complete with its own distinct language
consisting of different vocabularies and different definitions of
those overlapping terms. "Competition" to an antitrust lawyer
will normally conjure up images of a market with a reasonable
number of producers and consumers acting independently and
not colluding to raise price or restrict output. To an interna-
tional trade lawyer "competition" involves a complex series of
distinctions between "fair" and "unfair" acts and the applica-
tion of tariffs, quotas, import bans, and other forms of retalia-
tion to combat "unfair competition" by foreign firms and gov-
ernments. An antitrust purist would be inclined to applaud the
majority of those foreign practices condemned under interna-
tional trade law, such as most types of dumping, and condemn
most of the traditional solutions against those unfair trade poli-
cies as injurious to the antitrust conception of competition. For
example, part of the reason that the ongoing debate over
whether United States antitrust law hurts United States export
"competitiveness" is so fruitless is that both sides have radically
different vocabularies and terms of reference.
There is a pressing need to unify international trade and
antitrust concerns. The growth of world and regional markets
has blurred the distinction between intermarket and in-
tramarket competition responsible for the traditional division
between antitrust and international trade law. The regulation of
international trade has a dramatic effect on competition within
national markets whenever imports are a significant actual or
potential factor limiting collusion and monopoly in a market.
Import relief laws can be used and abused in a manner to-limit
competition, and occasionally violate the antitrust laws. Na-
tional antitrust law affects the operation of United States firms
abroad and the operation of foreign firms doing business with
the United States. Antitrust principles can themselves be mis-
used as instruments of protection.
Fortunately, there is a growing literature on the convergence
of antitrust law and international trade under the rubric of com-
petition. Most of the literature previously has focused on the ap-
plication of United States antitrust law to international trade.
6. See generally S. WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW (1992);
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Relatively little of the bridging literature has come from the in-
ternational trade community. This is not surprising given the fo-
cus of international trade scholars on the multilateral regulation
of international trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT),7 which does not address trade problems in
antitrust terms.' There is a paucity of literature that attempts
the double bridge of comparing the links between trade and
competition for the United States as well as other legal systems.
The newest and most ambitious entrant in this field is ANTI-
TRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES by Mdrio Mar-
ques Mendes." The book's subtitle, and field of inquiry, is "The
Interplay Between Antitrust and Trade Policies in the US and
the EEC." The book arose out of Mr. Mendes' graduate studies
at the University of Michigan Law School and his exposure to
that school's outstanding faculty in both disciplines. 10 Mr.
Mendes has researched widely and deeply in his chosen fields to
develop his rationalization of two fields in two separate
systems."
The volume is divided into three parts. The first section be-
W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (4th ed. 1991); J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981); E. KINTER & M.
JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER (1974). Cf., B. HAWK, UNITED STATES,
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1989); COMMON
MARKET AND UNITED STATES ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (J. Rahl ed. 1970).
There is also an immense periodical literature dealing with the jurisdictional princi-
ples regarding the assertion of national competition law on an extraterritorial basis. See
Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing in Transnational Litigation, 23 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925 (1991).
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 188, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
8. See J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY (1975); K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION (1970); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
The relative lack of interest is particularly ironic given the previous attempts to
incorporate competition provisions into the failed International Trade Organization and
the Organization for Trade Cooperation. See M. MENDES, ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF IN-
TERRELATED ECONOMIES 34-35 (1991) [hereinafter M. MENDES].
9. See generally M. MENDES, supra note 8.
10. Mr. Mendes had the opportunity to study international trade under Professor
John Jackson, one of the world's preeminent GATT scholars, and antitrust law with
Professor Thomas Kauper, who served as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice. See M. MENDES, supra
note 8, at vii-viii, 1-2.
11. The book is heavily documented with some footnotes consisting of elaborate es-
says. In places, the sheer volume of footnotes, which approaches a 1:1 ration of footnotes
to text, and their placement gets a bit distracting.
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gins with a broad overview of the development of post-World
War II trade policy, primarily in terms of the development of
the GATT system and the strains imposed as the GATT seeks
to deal with nontariff barriers and new forms of protectionism. 12
The overview continues with a brief review of the limited at-
tempts to regulate international competition through the GATT,
its predecessors, the United Nations, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, and national attempts to
apply antitrust principles to international trade.13 Part II exam-
ines the antitrust systems of both the United States and the
EEC with particular emphasis on the institutional enforcement
of antitrust in both systems, the assertion of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction, the statutory and judicial exemptions for export con-
duct, and the special defenses relating to foreign commerce. 4
All of this is prelude to Mendes' real interest in the inter-
section of competition and trade policy from a comparative per-
spective. What Mendes calls the "crosscurrents" between trade
and competition is really an examination of the failed opportu-
nities for the introduction of competition principles in the im-
port relief decisions of both the United States and the EEC.15
Mendes convincingly demonstrates how the United States ig-
nores or marginalizes competition concerns in restricting im-
ports involving both fair and unfair competition.
What is most interesting to a reader from the United States
is Mendes' analysis of the failure of the EEC to do any better
than the United States, despite the mandates of the EEC Treaty
to complete and extend a single unified community-wide mar-
ket, the existence of both trade and competition provisions and
legislation to further this goal, and the existence of more cen-
tralized Community institutions to implement these goals. 6 De-
spite the European Commission's enforcement powers over both
trade and antitrust, and more stringent limitations on private
rights of action and judicial review, Mendes suggests that the
Commission still has engaged in ad hoc tradeoffs between com-
petition and other values as it seeks to fulfill its mission as de-
12. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 19-32.
13. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 33-53.
14. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 57-138.
15. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 139-77. This section also icludes a shorter discus-
sion of the antitrust risks of misusing the import relief remedies. M. MENDES, supra note
8, at at 178-97.
16. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 167-77.
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fined by the EEC Treaty and the Council of Ministers.
Throughout the book, Mendes assumes a high degree of fa-
miliarity with the substance of both antitrust and international
trade law. He focuses on the enforcement policies and institu-
tions in each legal system as the key to the fragmentation of
competition and trade concerns in the formulation of policy in
both the United States and the EEC.17
Mendes is perceptive in both his description and analysis of
the fragmentation of antitrust and trade policy, particularly
within the United States. His thesis is that the fragmentation of
enforcement of both sets of laws among various government
agencies and private parties has prevented the convergence and
development of a unified vision of competition and its role in
international trade.
The only real shortcomings of the book are its limited and
somewhat anticlimactic prescriptions and conclusions. After the
thorough and methodical analysis of the tensions between anti-
trust and trade policy, Mendes is content to offer a relatively
brief overview of the debate in the United States over the ques-
tion of industrial policy as a potential solution to the divergent
goals of competition and trade policy.18 He also offers the propo-
sal by the Reagan Administration, and the rejection by Congress
in 1986, to relax United States antitrust laws to aid industries
unable to compete in world markets as a further example of the
many parties within the United States system which influence
antitrust policy and limit the wholesale realignment of competi-
tion policy in the name of trade concerns.' 9
His conclusions for the EEC are even more general. He re-
gards the EEC as subject to the same fundamental split between
competition and trade concerns in the implementation of the
EEC Treaty despite the explicit overarching goal of the creation
of the internal market. He suggests that there should be greater
coordination in the future based on the adoption of Article
130(f) of the EEC Treaty, added by the Single European Act,
which calls for the strengthening of the scientific and technologi-
cal basis of European industry and the promotion of European
competitiveness at the international level, while taking particu-
17. This assumption of mastery of the substance of the two areas may be unfounded
given the thesis that both areas have developed independently.
18. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 239-64.
19. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 239-64.
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lar account of both trade and competition policy.20 Mendes fur-
ther suggests that the growth of private rights of actions, in-
creased judicial review, and the potential expansion of the
jurisdiction of the European Community Court of First Instance
to include both trade and competition cases, may result in a
more coherent body of law integrating both disciplines.21
Mendes has properly analyzed the inherent contradictions
between trade and antitrust and how specific trade policies and
import relief statutes conflict with competition policy in both
systems. What tends to exist so far is a one way subjugation of
antitrust law to the needs of trade policy, while competition con-
cerns exist, if at all, at the periphery of most import relief
decisions.
The key to unraveling the contradictions that Mendes es-
tablishes lies in an area nqt analyzed in the book. What remains
to be done is to examine the broader question of how competi-
tion law fits into the hierarchy of values implemented in trade
policy. Is competition so far down the list that it can be ignored
by policy makers? Similarly, has antitrust law been coopted as
an instrument of trade policy? Must it inevitably be so? These
are critical questions for which Mendes has set the stage for con-
sideration, but has not attempted to resolve.
Mdrio Marques Mendes is a part of a broad movement to
create a new discipline which will address these challenges. Even
if the trade policy process is not changed, it will be clarified and
stripped of the rhetoric obscuring the real choices which have to
be made. ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES
is a welcome addition to the study of competition in its many
and varied forms.
20. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 130(f).
21. M. MENDES, supra note 8, at 177-78. Mendes' predictions for the EEC are some-
what undermined by his analysis that the proliferation of actors in the United States has
prevented such a convergence from arising.
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